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ABSTRACT 
 
Elements of both mudārabah (fund management) as well as shirkah (partnership) in Islamic law are reflected in the operation of 
investment accounts offered by Islamic financial institutions.  A number of partners pooling their funds together for running a 
business operation is possible under shirkah.  Similarly, mixing mudārabah capital with funds of the mudārib (entrepreneur/fund 
manager) could be valid according to the majority of schools with express permission from the investor.  In mudārabah, the 
schools of Islamic law have recognised the validity of several parties jointly investing funds with a common mudārib through a 
single contract.  Such investment should take place jointly on a single occasion, so that the tenure of mudārabah could 
commence with regard to all capitals at the same time.  Where the mudārib accepts investments from different individuals 
through individual contracts, the majority of schools require that the business of each capital be managed separately.  This 
restriction is due to fundamental anomalies that may result from mixing different capitals, which, having mobilised in business 
separately, could be at different stages of profit or loss.  However, jurists of the Hanafi school appear to have allowed the 
mudārib to mix funds of different investors together with their permission.  This could possibly indicate permissibility of mixing 
funds invested at different stages when overall permission had been obtained.  The procedure adopted in this regard in the 
investment accounts run by Islamic banks requires further research and scrutiny.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In the contemporary arena of Islamic banking, joint investment accounts replace interest-based deposit accounts found in the 
conventional banking system.  Provided as an alternative to conventional interest based accounts such as fixed deposit accounts 
and saving accounts, these facilitate clients to invest their surplus resources through the mediation of the bank for realising 
profits.  Investment accounts serve the dual purpose of supplying necessary capital for investment by the bank in various 
projects, in addition to acting as the primary means through which the earnings of the bank are distributed among the public who 
do not happen to be shareholders of the bank, a vital function expected of Islamic banks that could be of great economic import.  
In conventional banking, consumer deposits form a major source of funds for the bank, that are cheaper than „bought-in‟ funds 
from the money markets.1  The term „deposits‟ is often used to describe the money which customers leave with the banks on 
current, deposit, and other accounts.  If a current account is defined as an account which is opened so that cheques may be drawn 
on it, then a deposit account can be defined as an account which is opened to earn interest.2  In the conventional system, a wide 
variety of deposit accounts offers interest at different rates to clients.   
 
MECHANISM OF EQUITY ACCOUNTS 
Prior to embarking on a detailed analysis of individual issues, it would be relevant here to present a brief survey of the 
operational mechanism adopted by Islamic banks in general in joint investment accounts.  Usually offered under the name of 
mudārabah accounts, these allow clients to make capital deposits at any point of time, subsequent to opening the account by 
signing the agreement with the bank, often referred to as a mudārabah agreement, and placing an initial deposit.  These accounts 
could be opened in the name of individuals as well as joint investors such as husbands and wives, business firms and societies, 
and in some instances, legal entities such as companies and trusts.  Many Islamic banks allow investment accounts in the name 
of minors, where the parent or guardian is required to represent their interests.  Each depositor is treated as a financier (rabb al-
māl) who hands over funds to the bank for investment in profitable activities against a share of the profits.  The deposits are 
treated as mudārabah capital, the liability of which is borne by the depositors / investors.  The bank represents the fund manager 
(mudārib) who receives funds from each depositor under a separate contract of mudārabah with each, and involves the funds in 
business ventures in an unrestricted or restricted form as agreed with the depositors.  Although the funds are received separately, 
they are converged into a common pool for investment purposes, which fact is usually highlighted in the initial agreement.  A 
ratio is agreed at the inception for distribution of profits between the bank and the joint pool of investors, such as 30 : 70 and 40 : 
60.  The agreements usually provide that loss affecting the pool would be solely borne by the depositors.  There could be 
different investment pools created for different investment purposes.       
                                                 
1 Philip Molyneux, Banking: An Introductory Text, London, Macmillan, 1991, p. 70.   
2 F. E. Perry, The Elements of Banking, 4th Ed, Singapore, Federal Publications, 1984, p. 322.   
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In many accounts, depositors are allowed to make withdrawals of the capital during the tenure of the contract and to make fresh 
deposits without major restrictions, except in the case of deposits involving some specific investment projects.  At the end of the 
designated cycle, usually consisting of three months to one year, which could extend in some long term specific investment 
projects up to three years, the profit / loss situation of the joint pool is assessed.  Any profits realised are divided between the 
bank and the pool of investors according to the agreed ratio.  There could be different ratios applicable to different types of 
investment.  Thereafter, profits accruing to the pool of investors is divided among individual investors taking into consideration 
the aggregate amounts invested by them during the cycle and the duration each deposit had remained in the pool, through a 
process known as the daily product method.  Profits accruing to investors are usually credited to their accounts and are reinvested 
with the capital, unless if the depositors choose to withdraw them or had advised otherwise.      
     
In sharī‛ah, deposit of funds into deposit accounts of conventional banks, similar to current deposits, falls under extending a loan 
(qard) to the bank.3  The major objection to such deposit accounts from an Islamic perspective is, of course, the interest element.  
As conclusively borne out by various individual scholars as well as a number of academic bodies and also the historic judgement 
delivered by the supreme court of Pakistan in December 1999, interest paid by the bank periodically on deposits in these 
accounts, being a stipulated excess on monetary capital, is ribā, and is impermissible.4  Therefore, deposit of funds into such 
accounts entail entering an interest based loan transaction.  A minority of contemporary scholars have argued for the 
permissibility of bank interest, which, however, is negated by the overwhelming majority of contemporary Islamic jurists.  This 
research does not intend to analyse the said debate as it falls outside the scope adopted, and instead follows the conclusion as 
upheld by the majority in its subsequent discussion.5        
 
In their quest to offer an account similar to deposit accounts offered by conventional banks where clients could deposit funds for 
varying periods without forgoing the opportunity of availing of a return, Islamic banks have succeeded in introducing joint 
equity investment accounts.  Instead of the platform of lending coupled with fixed interest adopted in conventional bank 
accounts, equity investment accounts are expected to operate on a profit and loss sharing basis.  Although called mudārabah 
investment accounts, the modus operandi here comprises an admixture of shirkah and mudārabah both, as the bank‟s own funds 
too are activated along with deposits in these accounts.  In most types of equity accounts, profit / loss is distributed periodically, 
at the end of a stipulated cycle such as six months or one year.           
 
JOINT EQUITY ACCOUNTS AND MUDĀRABAH / SHIRKAH CONTRACTS 
Although termed mudārabah investment accounts generally, joint equity accounts offered by Islamic banks do not totally 
conform to the fundamental mudārabah contract as put forth by jurists.  Equity accounts as generally offered today by many 
Islamic banks manifest features that have been developed through a convergence of, as well as various additions to, the 
principles of both shirkah and mudārabah.  These variations have been introduced in order to overcome issues faced in 
management of deposits from a large number of depositors at the same time and to face competition offered by the conventional 
banking industry.  Thus, maturity of deposits is subject to a cycle common to all deposits in a category and the determination of 
profit and loss is carried out with regard to most assets by constructive liquidation, rather than actual liquidation.  Some banks 
uphold the practice of holding reserves in order to meet potential losses.  Investors are not allowed to provide guidelines 
concerning the particular avenues of investment favoured by them and are required to accept investment decisions made by the 
bank, except in the case of restricted or special mudārabah accounts, where they are allowed to do so.  Deposits in joint equity 
accounts are usually involved in business ventures together with a part of the share capital of the bank.         
 
It is evident that in operational details, Islamic banks are pressured to mimic conventional interest based banks in order to 
survive, due to the prevailing environment comprising the expectations of depositors, entrepreneurs and regulators, as well as the 
pre-existing legal and regulatory system.6   Thus, joint investment accounts are designed in general to facilitate deposit and 
                                                 
3 Al-Ittihād al-Duwali li al-Bunūk al-Islāmiyyah, al-Mawsū‛ah al-‛Ilmiyyah wa al-‛Amaliyyah, vol. 5, p. 148, Muhammad Salāh Muhammad al-
Sāwi, Mushkilah al-Istithmār fī al-Bunīk al-Isāmiyyah wa Kayfa ‛ālajaha al-Islām, Jiddah, Dār al-Wafā, 1990, p. 438.     
4 E.g. Resolutions No. 10(10/2), 2nd Session of the Islamic Fiqh Academy, Jeddah – 1985, Resolution Nos. 1, 2, 2nd Conference on Islamic Banking, 
Kuwait - 1983.       
5 For a discussion on the topic, see al-Mawsū‛ah al-‛Ilmiyyah wa al-‛Amaliyyah li al-Bunūk al-Islāmiyyah, vol. 5, pp. 146-56;  Muhammad Taqi 
Usmāni, The Historic Judgment on Interest, Karachi, Idāratul Ma’arif, 2002; Mustafā ‛Abdullāh al-Hamshari, al-A‛māl al-Masrafiyyah wa al-
Islām, al-Qāhirah, al-Shirkah al-Misriyyah li al-Tabā‛ah wa al-Nashr, 1973, pp. 30-112; ‛Ali Ahmad al-Sālūs, al-Mu‛āmalāt al-Māliyyah al-
Mu‛āsirah fī Māzān al-Fiqh al-Islāmi, Kuwait, Maktabah al-Falāh, 1992.   
6 Frank E Vogel and Samuel L Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance: Risk, Religion and Return, London, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 134.  
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Vogel has discussed some of the issues where the Islamic banking model, which to a large extent involves deposit taking on the 
basis of mudārabah, has to elaborate its functions from an Islamic point of view.  He has grouped these under three headings, 
namely, problems in managing deposits, problems in organizing the Islamic bank using conventional legal forms and practices 
and problems arising from pressure on investment by the public along the lines of deposit accounts offered by conventional 
banks.  The elementary reasoning appears to be that an Islamic investment account functioning drastically different from 
conventional deposit accounts would not be favoured by a public accustomed to the convenience of the latter, and thus would fail 
to attract sufficient capital for investment purposes.  Due to this reason, operation of mudārabah investment accounts from a 
depositor‟s position is made essentially similar to maintaining a conventional deposit account.   
 
In view of the diverse areas of sharī‛ah importance relating to joint equity accounts, they remain a subject frequently taken up for 
consideration in conferences and forums on Islamic finance.  Numerous fatāwā and resolutions have been issued on various 
aspects on the operation of such accounts.  Collections of fatāwā issued by the sharī‛ah boards of various Islamic banks and other 
bodies such as the Albaraka conference contain many relating to them.7  The Jeddah based Islamic Fiqh Academy had held a 
session (i.e. the 13th session held in Dec. 2001 in Kuwait) where the subject of joint investment accounts of Islamic banks was 
discussed extensively.8  The Sharī‛a Standards of AAOIFI as well as their Accounting Standards are seen to have elaborated on 
guidelines concerning joint investment accounts9, where it has been attempted to regulate some of the anomalies inherent to their 
operation by providing specific rulings on the procedure to be followed in various instances.   
 
Due to various aspects of sharī‛ah importance pertaining to investment accounts offered on the basis of shirkah / mudārabah by 
Islamic banks, it would be pertinent here to evaluate the concept of joint equity accounts, the role played by the bank as mudārib, 
the nature of the relationship between the depositors and the bank.   
 
SHARĪ‛AH PERSPECTIVE OF THE CONCEPT OF JOINT INVESTMENT 
As far as joint investment on the basis of shirkah is concerned, the possibility of a multiparty shirkah where a number of partners 
pool their funds together for running a business operation appears well supported by accepted texts of Islamic law.  Since the 
concept of partnership refers in general to sharing of capital and profits, participation of even a large number of people for this 
purpose does not appear to be extraordinary.  Thus, frequent mention of such multiparty relationships is found in Islamic texts.  
However, in the case of mudārabah, where capital is contributed by one party to another for investment and management, the 
usual format discussed is noted to be that of a two party relationship.  However, rulings pertaining to mudārabah relationships 
involving a number of parties, is to be found in Islamic legal literature, which amply indicates that the such multiparty 
relationships are permissible in mudārabah in principle.  The Hanafi jurist al-Sarkhasi,10  the Māliki jurist Ibn ‛Abd al-Barr,11 the 
Hanbali jurist Ibn Qudāmah, 12 the Shāfi‛i jurist al-Nawawi, 13 among others, have discussed instances where mudārabah 
involves more than two parties.  The Shāfi‛ī jurist al-Māwardi has discussed in detail different variations of profit sharing when 
two individuals invest their funds with two mudāribs.  Extending the same principle, there should be no bar to the contract 
involving a number of participants in both sides.   
 
In spite of this, mention of an instance where the funds of a large number of people are pooled together for being invested in 
business ventures by another body of individuals or an organisation acting as mudārib is not to be found in the treatment of the 
topic.  However, it may not be inferred from this that such an arrangement would be unacceptable or illegal, and that mudārabah 
could not be structured in this manner.  Islamic jurists had devoted their texts to analyse and illustrate the basic concepts and 
rulings pertaining to different types of business relationships, based on which any form of activity could be carried out involving 
any number of people, as long as the fundamental principles expounded are not violated.14  The number of participants itself 
would not be treated as a factor affecting the contract adversely except in instances where the number of participants is 
specifically restricted, such as in the contract of marriage.  Where this is not the case, a contract could be formulated with the 
association of any number of participants. 
   
                                                                                                                                                             
Islamic banks to frame deposits and investments to have risk and liquidity characteristics similar to those of conventional banks in order to 
compete.      
7 E.g. al-Fatāwā al-Shar‛iyyah fī al-Masā’il al-Iqtisādiyyah of the Sharī‛ah Board of Kuwait Finance House, Fatāwā Shar‛iyyah Fī al-A‛māl al-
Masrafiyyah of Dubai Islamic Bank, A Compendium of Legal Opinions on the Operations of Islamic Banks of the Institute of Islamic Banking and 
Insurance.   
The Albaraka conferences on Islamic Economics that had issued resolutions on the subject include the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th  sessions.  See 
Fatāwā Nadwāt al-Barakah, Jeddah, Albaraka Bank.    
8 See Islamic Fiqh Academy, Majallah Majma‛ al-Fiqhī al-Islāmī, No.13, vol. 3.     
9 AAOIFI, Sharī‘a Standards May 2002, pp. 229-245.   
10 Al-Sarkhasi, al-Mabsūt, vol. 22, pp. 30-31.  
11 Ibn ‛Abd al-Barr al-Qurtubi, al-Kāfi, Bayrūt, Dār al-Kutub al-‛Ilmiyyah, 1408H, vol. 1, p. 387.  
12 Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughni, vol. 5, pp. 145, 146.       
13 Al-Māwardi, al-Hāwi al-Kabīr, vol. 7, pp. 355, 356, al-Nawawi, Rawdah al-Tālibīn, vol. 4, p. 205.   
14 Muhammad Taqi Usmani “al-Mudārabah al-Mushtarakah fī al-Mu’assasāt al-Māliyyah al-Islāmiyyah al-Mu‛āsirah”, in Majallah Majma‛ al-
Fiqh al-Islāmi, 13th Session 2001, vol. 3, p. 11.  
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SIMULTANEOUS INVESTMENT BY ALL INVESTORS 
According to the recognised norms of mudārabah, where several parties invest with a single mudārib, such investment is 
understood to take place on a single occasion, so that the tenure of mudārabah could commence with regard to all deposits at the 
same time.15  Juristic rulings on the topic indicate that although several parties were allowed to invest with a single mudārib, all 
of them were perceived to invest on the same occasion under a single contract, which requires the parties having agreed 
beforehand to invest their funds on mudārabah.  As was referred to above,16 apart from the Hanafi school, there appears little 
room for merging of different investments made on different occasions.  The Māliki position suggests the possibility of the 
mudārib combining funds received from different individuals under separate contracts, which need not have commenced at the 
same time.  However, Māliki texts imply that in this instance, involvement of the funds in trade would take place after combining 
them, which ensures simultaneous commencement of operations with regard to all capital.  As far as combining two investments 
made on different occasions in a single mudarabah is concerned, i.e. to combine a capital invested later to an existing mudārabah 
that is active, this has been held impermissible by Māliki jurists.17  Similarly, Shāfi‛i and Hanbali jurists have indicated its 
unacceptability.  The least restrictive on this issue appears to be the position adopted by the Hanafi school, which indicates that it 
is permitted for the mudārib to mix the mudārabah funds with his own or with the funds of another, when the investor grants 
overall permission to the mudārib to transact using the mudārabah funds as he wishes, or when such mixing is customary.  This 
could mean that simultaneous commencement of mudārabah by all investors is not considered mandatory in the Hanafi school.18   
 
With regard to modern investment accounts, if the majority position were to be adopted , observance of this aspect would 
demand that deposits for investment be taken at the same time.  The mudārabah investment taking would have to be 
programmed in such a way that instead of a single cycle for all investors that accepts deposits at any point of time during its 
tenure, different cycles that run more or less concurrently are commenced at intervals, facilitating a group of investors to invest 
together in a single cycle that commences on a date convenient to them.  Once an investment cycle had commenced with a 
defined group of investors, additional investment by fresh investors would not be possible.  Thus, this could dictate the inception 
of multiple mudārabahs, which could partially resemble closed-end investment funds due to non-acceptance an increase in the 
original investors.  However, this process could involve various difficulties with regard to managing each mudārabah investment 
portfolio separately, in addition to restricting the opportunity to invest anytime as found in conventional bank accounts, as those 
wishing to invest would need to wait until the date of commencement of a cycle, and would have to forgo the opportunity of 
involving their funds in business for that duration.  Thus, this is an aspect that has been cited as a reason for identifying joint 
equity accounts as a novel variety of mudārabah where restrictions necessitating simultaneous investment have been relaxed, as 
shall be discussed subsequently.19  However, it can be noted that the Hanafi position indicated above provides some leeway for 
mixing of funds belonging to different investors, which could justify the practice adopted in modern equity accounts within the 
parameters of traditional mudārabah as far as this aspect is concerned.      
 
THE NATURE OF THE MUDĀRIB (FUND MANAGER) 
If investment on mudārabah is to materialise on a large scale, appointment of a single individual or a group of individuals as 
mudārib may involve unnecessary restrictions with regard to functionality and operations.  Although a group of individuals 
acting as mudārib could be sufficient in operations of a relatively smaller scale, it would prove inadequate with regard to mass 
scale fund accumulation as is done in the course of commercial banking.  Raising and management of such funds usually takes 
place through modern companies, which are identified as juridical personalities.  In the case of investments on mudārabah basis 
involving a juridical person such as a limited company, it is necessary to verify the identity of the mudārib.  Consequent to 
incorporation, a limited company becomes a legal person distinct from its members, i.e. the shareholders who, apart from a right 
to their shares, do not have any direct rights to the property of the company.20  The board of directors are entrusted with the 
management of the company.  The legal title to the company‟s property is vested in the company and not in the directors, who 
are servants of the company only if they have a separate contract of service.21  However, due to the fact that the company is 
represented by its board of directors, some contemporary scholars hold them in the position of mudārib for the funds of 
mudārabah.22  In this case the responsibility of managing the funds devolves on them clearly.  Even if the shareholders or the 
juridical entity of the bank itself is identified as mudārib, in either situation, for practical purposes, the board of directors are seen 
to act on behalf of them in a representative capacity.   
 
In the view of some other contemporary scholars, the Islamic bank itself, as a legal person, is the mudārib.23  Some scholarly 
bodies concerned with Islamic banking have supported this opinion in their resolutions.24  Although the shareholders are the 
                                                 
15 Al-Nawawi, Rawdah al-Tālibīn, vol. 4, p. 205, Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughni, vol. 5, pp. 146.  
16 See sections on mingling capitals invested by different investors and Hanafi position on mixing funds of different investors together above. 
17 Al-Dardīr, al-Sharh al-Kabīr, vol. 3, p. 323.   
18 Ibn ‛ābidīn, Radd al-Muhtār, vol. 5, p. 649, 650. 
19 Muhammad Taqi Usmāni above.   
20 Abbot, Company Law, p. 39.   
21 Ibid, p. 171.   
22 Al-Siddīq al-Darīr, “Madā mas’ūliyyah al-mudārib wa majlis al-īdārah ‛ammā yahduth min al-khasārah”, in Majallah Majma‛ al-Fiqh al-Islāmi, 
1996, Year 8, vol. 10, p. 62.   
23 Muhammad Taqi Usmani, “al-Mudārabah al-Mushtarakah fī al-Mu’assasāt al-Māliyyah al-Islāmiyyah”, in Majallah Majma‛ al-Fiqh al-Islāmi, 
13th Session 2001, vol. 3, p. 16. 
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owners of the company, it is difficult to regard them as the mudārib in this instance, due to the distinction brought about by the 
involvement of the juridical person, which, on the whole, limits the relationship of the shareholders with the venture to 
ownership of their shares and entitlement to dividends.  As far as the directors are concerned, their capacity is not seen to exceed 
management of the company.  As such, the involvement of the directors in the mudārabah agreement is only for the purpose of 
representation.  On this basis, the mudārib is held to be the juridical person involved, i.e. the company itself.    
 
As the entity of mudārib as discussed in Islamic legal texts is invariably portrayed as a single individual or several individuals, it 
would be necessary to examine whether a juridical entity could be appointed as mudārib.  The sharī‛ah perspective of the concept 
of legal personality being a subject requiring a separate discussion, it would not be feasible to cover this issue adequately within 
the scope of the current research.  However, the topic has been studied by contemporary sharī‛ah scholars at some length, and 
despite of some objections,25 it appears to be accepted by many that the concept of juridical personality is recognised in sharī‛ah, 
and that business institutions that are juridical persons could be formulated in a valid manner, with certain restrictions.26  This 
research would proceed based on this postulation.   
 
Accordingly, when funds are deposited with a company on mudārabah, the contract takes place between the company as a 
juridical person and the investors.  Based on this, it has been held that changes occurring in the owners of the entity or the board 
of directors would not affect the relationship between the investors and the mudārib, i.e. the institution.  Consequent to 
identifying the juridical entity as the mudārib, the relevant rights and liabilities would necessarily be associated with this entity. 
 
COMMON MANAGEMENT OF CAPITAL BY MUDĀRIB THROUGH MIXING FUNDS WITH HIS OWN  
In funds invested with financial institutions on mudārabah, involvement of funds in business operations is often carried out in 
common with the institution‟s capital.  A portion of the share capital or other funds available with the institution is invested 
along with the mudārabah capital.  It would be relevant to examine whether this process affects the nature of the mudārabah 
contract in any manner, due to the fact that investment always comes from one of the contracting parties in a mudārabah 
contract.  Some jurists have recognised such mixing of funds by the mudārib only when the financier expresses his consent to it.  
If the mudārib mixes mudārabah capital with his own funds without such permission, he becomes liable for the capital.  This 
could indicate that such unauthorised mingling of mudārabah funds with his own is counted as an act of transgression that 
abolishes the mudārib‟s immunity from bearing liability.  As explained by the Hanbali jurist Ibn Qudāmah, this is because 
mudārabah capital is considered to be amānah, i.e. funds given on trust, similar to a deposit for safekeeping (wadī‛ah), which he 
is expected to manage separately.27  However, if the investor had authorised the mudārib to manage the funds based on his own 
discretion, this has been considered sufficient by way of permission according to the majority of schools, as the mudārib may 
require such mixing in the course of operations.28  Shāfi‛i jurists do not regard such general authority sufficient for mixing 
capitals, and rule that the mudārib becomes liable for the funds in this event.29  Even where the investor expressly allows mixing, 
another Shāfi‛i principle becomes relevant, viz. that where there is investment from both contractors, profit sharing should 
necessarily be on the ratio of capital.  The labour component ceases to play a role in entitlement to profits, when the capital is 
common.30  However, it appears from some Shāfi‛i texts that when the capital is mixed with funds of the mudārib, if there 
happens to be a separate shirkah contract in part of the investor‟s capital, where, evidently, profit is proportionate to capitals, 
while the remainder of the investor‟s capital is on mudārabah, the arrangement is valid.  At the same time, with regard to 
common capital jointly owned by two partners, i.e. on shirkah al-milk, Shāfi‛i jurists have allowed one of them to enter into a 
mudārabah with the other in his own share, provided the labour rests with the mudārib only.  In this instance, the mudārib would 
be entitled to the profit of his portion of the capital, while sharing the profit of the other as agreed.31  Thus, the Shāfi‛i position in 
this regard seems to be that where the mudārib mixes the mudārabah capital with his own funds with the approval of the investor 
for joint investment in business, profit sharing should necessarily be on the ratio of capitals.  Otherwise, the mudārib should 
enter into a shirkah contract in part of his capital where the above guideline is observed, while contracting a mudārabah in the 
rest on any ratio as wished.32  Māliki jurists have allowed mixing even without the permission of the investor, provided any 
condition that necessitates such mixing is not stipulated.33  The Hanafi position on the issue was mentioned above,34 according to 
                                                                                                                                                             
24 Shariah Board of Dallah Albaraka, Fatāwā Nadawāt al-Barakah, Jeddah, Dallah Albaraka, resolution No. 10/10, p. 181.   
25 For a summary of objections raised against a sharī‛ah recognition of juridical personality, see Muhammad Akram Khan, “Accounting Issues 
and Concepts for Islamic Banks”, paper presented at the international seminar on financial accounting standards for Islamic banks and financial 
institutions, Bahrain, Jan 1993, pp. 7-11. 
26 Muhammad Taqi Usmāni, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, Karachi, Idaratul Ma’arif, 2000, pp. 223 -231; Wahbah al-Zuhayli, Juhūd Taqnīn 
al-Fiqh al-Islāmī, Beirut, Mu’assasah al-Risālah, 1987, pp. 70-74, 84; Abd al-‛Azīz al-Khayyāt, Sharikāt fī al-Sharī‛ah al-Islāmiyyah, Bayrūt, 
Mu’assasah al-Risālah, 1994, vol. 1, pp. 208-246; Sālih ibn Zābin al-Marzūqi, al-Shirkah al-Musāhamah fī al-Nizām al-Su‛ūdi, Jāmi‛ah Umm al-
Qurā, Markaz al-Bahth al-‛Ilmī, 1406H, pp. 195-238; al-Sayyid ‛Alī al-Sayyid, al-Hissah bi al-‛Amal bayn al-Fiqh al-Islāmi wa al-Qānūn al-Wad‛i, 
al-Qāhirah, al-Majlis al-A‛lā li al-Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyyah, 1973, pp. 49-67.  Some resolutions of the Islamic Fiqh Academy such as resolution No. 
63/1/7 on the permissibility of limited liability companies are also relevant in this regard.         
27 Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughni, vol. 5, p. 162.   
28 Ibid. 
29 al-Nawawi, Rawdah al-Tālibīn, vol. 4, p. 224. 
30 Ibid.  
31 al-Sharbīni, Mughni al-Muhtāj, vol. 2, p. 419, al-Nawawi, Rawdah al-Tālibīn, vol. 4, p. 220.    
32 This inference needs further verification. 
33 Al-Dardīr, al-Sharh al-Kabīr, vol. 3, p. 523, al-Khurashi, Hāshiyah al-Khurashi, vol. 7, p. 157. 
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which the mudārib is permitted to mix the mudārabah funds with his own or with that of another when the investor had granted 
him overall permission to transact using the mudārabah funds as he wishes.  Thus, mixing of mudārabah funds with the funds of 
the mudārib could be valid according to all schools other than the Shāfi‛i when the investor grants express permission to the fund 
manager to do so.   
 
It is evident from the above that where the investors in a joint mudārabah fund allow the institution (i.e. mudārib) to mix its own 
funds with mudārabah capital, it cannot be held contrary to the norms of mudārabah according to the majority of schools.  Such 
mixing would alter the relationship of the institution to the investors slightly, which, however, would not be of any material 
importance.  Subsequent to the admixture of funds, its relationship with the mudārabah investors would also reflect an element 
of shirkah, in view its own capital invested in the pool.  Thus, the institution as a joint partner or sharīk would claim an amount 
of profit proportionate to its capital involvement in the pool, while also being entitled to a part of the proportion of profit 
accruing to the mudārabah capital, due to its role of fund manager (mudārib).  The AAOIFI Sharī‛a standards have upheld the 
same position, stating that the mudārib in the event of such mingling of funds becomes a partner in respect of his funds and a 
mudārib in respect of the funds of the capital provider.35  
 
JOINT INVESTORS IN MUDĀRABAH 
When the contract of mudārabah comprises more than a single individual on each side, it could be observed that the contract 
here comprise two types of relationships.  The contract of mudārabah occurs between the group of financiers or investors and the 
fund manager, who too could be an entity comprising several individuals.  It would be pertinent to examine the nature of the 
relationship between the investors themselves.  Determining the relationship among the investors would depend to a great extent 
on whether they had invested jointly through a single contract or through separate contracts.  All schools of Islamic law appear to 
have recognised the validity of several parties jointly investing funds that are commonly owned by them with a single mudārib, 
through a single contract.36  The joint investment with the mudārib in this instance could indicate some similarity with shirkah 
al-‛aqd, as funds are invested based on a common contract for earning a return.  However, it is pertinent to note here that the 
investors had not entered into a contractual arrangement among themselves, resulting in agency to deal in the capital shares of 
each other, as necessary in the case of a proper shirkah al-‛aqd.37  Thus, if the funds invested commonly with the mudārib had 
belonged to them jointly, the shirkah al-milk that existed would remain even after the investment.  The relationship among the 
investors here being different from a proper shirkah al-‛aqd is further endorsed by the fact that even the Hanafi and Hanbali 
schools have required profit division among the investors here to take place based on the proportion of their capitals, any 
agreement to the contrary being void.38       
 
Where funds are invested by different investors at different points of time with a single mudārib, a relationship could be assumed 
to result if the mudārib mixes their capitals together for common management.  Whether the investors had expressed their 
consent to such mixing too would be relevant in this regard.  Therefore, we shall analyse below the position of Islamic schools of 
law on the mudārib combining capitals invested by different parties under different contracts.    
 
MINGLING CAPITALS INVESTED BY DIFFERENT INVESTORS 
From a perusal of Islamic legal texts, it is evident that the Shāfi‛i and the Hanbali schools have shown the least acceptance to 
mingling capitals of different investors together.  The restriction on this issue is such that combining capitals invested even by 
the same party at different occasions is considered unacceptable.  This is because, after mobilisation in business, each capital 
acquires its own profit loss position, which may not be verified until liquidation.  As such, fresh capital may not be added to it at 
this stage.  Explaining the issue, the Shāfi‛i jurist al-Nawawi states that after investing a sum of capital with the mudārib, if the 
same investor forwards another sum, it could be combined with the first sum only if the first sum had remained with the mudārib 
unutilised thus far.  If the first sum had already been involved in trade, the later sum may not be combined with it, as the profit / 
loss status of the former capital had already become established.  Each capital is separately entitled to its own profit or loss.39  
The Hanbali position on the issue is similar,40 who add that if such combining is stipulated in the second contract, it would 
become invalid.  However, if the first capital, after mobilisation in trade, had been restored to cash, the second amount could be 
combined with it without any objection, with the permission of the investor.  As combining of capitals forwarded by the same 
investor on different occasions has been considered unacceptable after the former amount had been invested in trade, it follows 
that capitals of different investors forwarded on different occasions, i.e. through separate contracts, may not be merged.  Thus, 
where the mudārib accepts investments from different individuals through individual contracts at various points of time, he is 
                                                                                                                                                             
34 See section on Hanafi position on mixing funds of different investors together above.   
35 AAOIFI Sharī‛a Standards, Standard No. 13, 8/9.   
36 Al-Sarkhasi, al-Mabsūt, vol. 22, pp. 30-31, Ibn ‛Abd al-Barr al-Qurtubi, al-Kāfi, vol. 1, p. 387, Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughni, vol. 5, pp. 145, 146, al-
Nawawi, Rawdah al-Tālibīn, vol. 4, p. 205.  
37 See Chapter 2, section on shirkah al-‛aqd.   
38 Al-Sarkhasi, al-Mabsūt, vol. 22, pp. 30-31, Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughni, vol. 5, pp. 145, 146.  See for details section below on distribution of 
profit among mudārabah investors.  In spite of investing jointly, if each investor agrees on a different profit allocation to the mudārib from his 
share of profits, Al-Sarakhsi considers the situation similar to two different contracts.   
39 Al-Nawawi, Rawdah al-Tālibīn, vol. 4, p. 224. 
40 Ibn Qudāmah, al-Mughni, vol. 5, pp. 175. 
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required to manage the business of each capital separately.  If some mistake occurs inadvertently where the assets of different 
businesses are merged, the mudārib could be held liable for the capitals.41   
 
Māliki texts indicate the permissibility of mixing capitals invested by two individuals with a mudārib even when each had 
invested separately.  They consider that this may not result in harm to the interests of either party.  Obtaining the permission of 
both investors for such mixing has not been deemed mandatory.  Although not resulting in the liability of mudārib, arbitrary 
mixing has been deemed to be an offence requiring repentance.42  However, such mixing is permitted only before one of the two 
capitals is involved in operations, provided there is an assured benefit in mixing capitals.  This indicates that mixing the capitals 
after involvement in operations is not accepted in the Māliki school.43  Where mingling of the capitals occurs with the consent of 
the investors, i.e. before involvement in trading, as well as when their consent is not ascertained, based on the shirkah principle 
of dividing profits according to capital input, the profit, as well as the loss, should be divided based on the proportion of their 
respective capitals.44  Therefore, arbitrary mixing by the mudārib is not materially effective as far as profit division is concerned.  
Where mixing is done with the consent of the investors, the relationship between the investors could reflect a partial semblance 
of shirkah al-‛aqd.   
 
Hanafi position on mixing funds of different investors together 
According to Hanafi jurists whose position is distinct on this issue, when the investor grants overall permission to the mudārib to 
transact using the mudārabah funds as he wishes, (lit. by saying “Do as you see fit”), the mudārib is permitted in this event to 
mix the mudārabah funds with his own or with the funds of another.45  Others have elucidated that such overall permission is 
necessary when such mixing is not customary in the land.  If such mixing happens to be common among the people of the 
locality and is not objected to, the mudārib is permitted to mix even when a general permission has not proceeded from the 
investor.46     
 
The above only indicates that the mudārib is allowed to mix mudārabah capital with his own or with that of others, especially 
when permission for the purpose had been obtained.  However, it is not clear from these texts whether the mixing referred to here 
takes place while the capital or capitals are still in cash form, or after some of them had been turned into assets after involvement 
in trade.  The Hanafi jurist Ibn ‛Ābidīn has provided an interesting reference from the Hanafi work al-Tātarkhāniyyah, which 
indicates that mixing may take place even after the capitals had been mobilised in trade.  However, this reference only mentions 
an instance when the investments are from the same investor.  Therefore, the ruling pertaining to mixing capitals of different 
investors together after some of them had been involved in trade can only be inferred from this, based on the overall recognition 
of mixing mudārabah capital by Hanafi jurists referred to above.  According to Ibn ‛Ābidīn‟s quotation from al-Tātarkhāniyyah, 
if the mudārib arbitrarily mixes mudārabah funds with another investment from the same investor, he would be held liable only 
if the mixing takes place after the appearance of profit, in which event he would be liable for the capital as well as the profit 
share of the investor.  However, if the arbitrary mixing took place before, the mudārib would not bear any liability.  If the 
mudārib had mixed the capitals with permission from the investor to do so with regard to each, he would not bear any liability 
irrespective of whether the mixing took place before the appearance of profit or afterwards.47  This indicates that when the 
several investments are made by the same investor at different stages, i.e. after the previous investments had been mobilised in 
business, with individual permission to mix the particular investment with other funds, it is condoned by Hanfi jurists.  Although 
specific reference is lacking, due to the mudārib being allowed by Hanafi jurists to mix funds of different investors together 
especially with the permission of the investors, it can be inferred from the above that mixing funds of different investors together 
at any stage of the business could be recognised as valid, when overall permission of the investors had been obtained for the 
purpose.48  This could provide a justification for an Islamic bank, in its capacity as mudārib, mixing funds invested by different 
investors through different contracts, even when some funds had already been involved in trade and given rise to profit, when the 
consent of the investors had been obtained for the purpose.   
 
When funds invested by several parties with a common mudārib are mingled with the consent of the parties, or when such 
mingling for earning profit is upheld by custom, according to the Hanafi position, the partnership among such investors could 
reflect characteristics of a sharikah al-‛aqd.  However, as explained above, it is questionable whether the relationship could be 
categorised as a full-fledged shirkah al-‛aqd.   
 
It should be noted that when such mingling takes place after the previously invested capital had been involved in operations, at 
the capital contribution of the late coming investor, the assets of the former investors are not evaluated so as to ascertain the 
value of their capital.  It appears that upon liquidation of the whole venture, the profits would be shared on the basis of the capital 
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibn Rushd, al-Bayān wa al-Tahsīl, Beirut, Dar al-Fikr, 1405H, vol. 12, p. 350, as quoted by Muhammad Taqi Usmani above, p. 12.  
43 Al-Dardīr, al-Sharh al-Kabīr, vol. 3, p. 523. 
44 Although a clear reference to this effect could not be found in Māliki texts on mudārabah, due to lack of any other basis, it could be stated 
with reasonable certainty that the ruling here can only be similar to their position on shirkah, where profits are invariably divided on capital 
ratio.   
45 Hāfiz al-Dīn Muhammad ibn Muhammad Ibn al-Bazzāz al-Kurdi, al-Fatāwā al-Bazzāziyyah, printed with al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyyah, vol. 6, p. 76.   
46 Ibn ‛ābidīn, Radd al-Muhtār, vol. 5, p. 649. 
47 See for details Ibn ‛ābidīn, Radd al-Muhtār, vol. 5, p. 649, 650.       
48 As the relevant Hanafi text is not explicit on this important issue, this inference needs verification by experts on Hanafi jurisprudence.   
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contributed by each partner at his joining the pool.49  Therefore, even when later joining of investors is accepted on the basis of a 
general permission granted by all the investors, the capital position existing at the entry of each new investor remains unverified.  
Moreover, since loss division in shirkah is to be done exactly on the basis of the capitals, allocation of loss may prove 
problematic.  Such anomaly could be a major reason for the rejection of later mixing of capitals after commencement of 
operations in the other schools of Law.   
 
Based on the above, according to the position adopted by Hanafi and Māiki schools, the relationship between the investors who 
invest at different times could bear some resemblance to shirkah al-‛aqd in some situations.  As far as Shāfi‛i and Hanbali 
schools are concerned, investments done at different occasions may not be managed together.  Also important is the fact that 
even where the relationship among the investors bears similarities to shirkah al-‛aqd, due to the absence of the right of 
management and mutual agency to deal in the capital of each other, it may not be construed as shirkah al-‛aqd in every respect.        
 
CONCLUSION 
Equity accounts manifest features developed through convergence of the principles of shirkah and mudārabah.  When funds are 
deposited with a company on mudārabah, the contract is held by some contemporary scholars to take place between the 
company as a juridical person and the investors.  A number of partners pooling their funds together for running a business 
operation is possible under shirkah.  In the case of mudārabah, schools of Islamic law have recognised the validity of several 
parties jointly investing funds with a common mudārib through a single contract.  Where several parties invest with a single 
mudārib, such investment should take place on a single occasion, so that the tenure of mudārabah could commence with regard 
to all deposits at the same time.  Where the mudārib accepts investments from different individuals through individual contracts, 
the majority of schools require that the business of each capital be managed separately.  The restriction is due to fundamental 
anomalies that may result from mixing different capitals.   
 
However, Hanafi jurists appear to have allowed the mudārib to mix funds of different investors together with the permission of 
the investors.  This could indicate permission for mixing funds invested at different stages when overall permission had been 
obtained.  Similarly, mixing mudārabah funds with funds of the mudārib could be valid according to the majority of schools 
with express permission of investors.  Thus the Hanafi position appears to accommodate to some extent the possibility of mixing 
funds belonging to different investors who had invested at varying points of time.  The procedure adopted in this regard in the 
investment accounts run by Islamic banks requires further research and scrutiny.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 See section below on distribution of profit among mudārabah investors.   
